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Four PPPPerspectives on computational creativity in theory
and in practice
Anna Jordanous
School of Computing, University of Kent, Medway Building, ChathamMaritime, Kent, UK
ABSTRACT
Computational creativity is the modelling, simulating or replicating
of creativity computationally. In examining and learning from these
“creative systems”, from what perspective should the creativity of a
system be considered? Are we interested in the creativity of the sys-
tem’s output? Or of its creative processes? Features of the system?Or
how it operates within its environment? Traditionally computational
creativity has focused more on creative systems’ products or pro-
cesses, though this focus has widened recently. Creativity research
offers the Four Ps of creativity: Person/Producer, Product, Process
and Press/Environment. This paper presents the Four Ps, explaining
each in the context of creativity research and how it relates to com-
putational creativity. To illustrate the usefulness of the Four Ps in
taking broader perspectives on creativity in its computational treat-
ment, the concepts of novelty and value are explored using the Four
Ps, highlighting aspects of novelty and value that may otherwise be
overlooked. Analysis of recent research in computational creativity
finds that although each of the Four Ps appears in the body of com-
putational creativity work, individual pieces of work often do not
acknowledge all Four Ps, missing opportunities to widen their work’s
relevance. We can see, though, that high-status computational cre-
ativity papers do typically address all Four Ps. This paper argues
that the broader views of creativity afforded by the Four Ps is vital
in guiding us towards more comprehensively useful computational
investigations of creativity.
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A practical issue arises when considering the evaluation of a computational creativity
system: from what perspective should creativity of a system be considered? Are we inter-
ested in the creativity of the system’s output? Or of its creative processes? Creativity as
measured by internal features or by external interactions?
The computational creativity community has traditionally considered creativity from
the perspective of the creative output produced by a system, or the processes employed
within creative systems (with notable exceptions, such as Saunders, 2012). The call for the
key international conference in this area (ICCC) invites papers addressing the “Process
vs. product: addressing the issue of evaluating/estimating creativity (or progress towards
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it) in computational systems through study of what they produce, what they do and
combinations thereof”.
This paper argues that to consider process and product is not enough; computational
creativity shouldbe consideredandexplored from fourdifferentperspectives, knownas the
Four Ps: the creative Person,1 Product, Process and Press (or environment) (MacKinnon, 1970;
Rhodes, 1961).
The Four Ps have long been prevalent in creativity research relating to humans2 and
enable a more inclusive and encompassing approach to the study of creativity and accom-
modatingmultiple relevant perspectives. Here the Four Ps are presented and considered in
the light of how they help computational creativity researchers in their overarching goal3
to model, simulate or replicate creativity computationally. The computational creativity
research community is already, as a whole, covering all the Four Ps; however many individ-
ual projectswithin this research field do not address all four perspectives. This paper argues
that individual projects that carefully address all Four Ps provide a wider contribution to
computational creativity research than those projects which only address, for example,
one or two Ps. Therefore if we highlight and raise awareness of each of the Four Ps within
computational creativity research, drawing upon similar research on human creativity, the
Four Ps framework can guide individual research projects to increase the contribution to
knowledge that their work is capable of.
2. The Four Ps of creativity
One major approach in creativity research is to break down creativity into four perspec-
tives, commonly referred to as the Four Ps (MacKinnon, 1970; Mooney, 1963; Odena and
Welch, 2009; Rhodes, 1961; Simonton, 1988; Stein, 1963; Tardif and Sternberg, 1988):
• Person: The individual agent that is creative. I propose in this paper that the term Pro-
ducer is more appropriate as it allows us consider the Four Ps in the contexts of both
human and computational creativity.
• Process: What the creative individual does to be creative.
• Product: What is produced as a result of the creative process.
• Press/Environment: The environment in which the creativity is situated.
In 1961, Rhodes (1961) identified theFourPperspectives. Rhodes collected40definitions
of creativity and 16 definitions of imagination. On analysis of these definitions, the ‘Four Ps’
of creativity emerged. It appears (from lack of referencing citations to each other’s work)
that several people independently identified these Four Ps of creativity (MacKinnon, 1970;
Mooney, 1963; Stein, 1963). This pattern of (seemingly) independent discovery helps sup-
port the credibility of the Four Ps, especially at a time when Guilford’s highly influential
paper on the study of creativity (Guilford, 1950) strongly encouraged a focus on personal
characteristics of creative people, rather than a broader study.4
Plucker, Beghetto, and Dow (2004) conducted a literature survey investigating the use
(or absence) of creativity definitions in creativity research. As part of this review, Plucker
et al. used their analysis to derive their own definition by identifying reoccurring themes
and forming these into an inclusive definitionwhich (perhaps unintentionally) accounts for


























Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and environment by which an individual
or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social
context. (Plucker et al., 2004, p. 90)
In reviewing Four Ps research, Kaufman (2009) described addendums that have been
suggested for the Four Ps: persuasion (Simonton, 1988) and potential (Runco, 2003). In gen-
eral, however, the Four Ps have been adopted as they were originally conceived by various
researchers (MacKinnon, 1970; Mooney, 1963; Rhodes, 1961; Stein, 1963).
2.1. The Four Ps: Person/Producer
This perspective addresses human characteristics associated with creative individuals or
groups of people. Encouraged by Guilford’s influential call in 1950 for studying the cre-
ative person, an abundance of different personal characteristics have been associated with
creativity (Koestler, 1964; Odena and Welch, 2009; Rhodes, 1961; Stein, 1963; Tardif and
Sternberg, 1988), ranging from personality traits, attitudes, intelligence and temperament,
to habits and behaviours such as curiosity, persistence, independence and openness. Some
of these are closely related; others are contradictory. Rhodes mentioned the relevance to
creativity of people’s personality traits, attitudes and habits, physique and intelligence and
the identifiable features of creative people, as well as referring to people’s temperament,
habits, self-concept, value systems, defence mechanisms and behaviour (Rhodes, 1961,
p. 307).
Empirical studies up until 1968 were summarised by Stein (1968) into a list of 18 distinct
personality characteristics of a creative person, including aspects such as curiosity, persis-
tence, independence and openness. Stein used these characteristics to identify creative
individuals for study. Stein’s method is prone to some circularity, as creative individuals
were identified using pre-defined creative characteristics/criteria, but Stein’s study involves
empirically examination of those characteristics and criteria. Stein’s work has not stood the
test of time, with few current citations.
Several researchers subdivide the ‘Person’ category into finer-grained groups. Three sub
categories of the ‘pupil’ perspective emerged during Odena andWelch’s work (Odena and
Welch, 2009): personal characteristics of the pupil; their individual learning style (either
adapting to new information or deriving new information themselves); and the influence of
the pupil’s background. Koestler (1964) described three types of creative person: the Artist;
the Sage and the Jester. Through Tardif and Sternberg’s review of definitions of creativity
(Tardif and Sternberg, 1988), three main categories were identified with which to describe
creative people: cognitive attributes; personality attributes/motivation; and developmen-
tal influences. From their categorisation, Tardif and Sternberg suggested three resultant
modes of study of human creativity: cognitive psychology; psychometric testing and study
of human development.
The different subdivisions described above do not neatly align alongside each other.
Tardif andSternberg’s reviewshowed that asof 1988, different authorshighlightedavariety
of characteristics, with no general consensus and no characteristics common to all reports
(Tardif and Sternberg, 1988, Table 17.1, p. 434). The sheer quantity of attributes collectively
places an obstacle in the way of compiling a definitive list of attributes of a creative person
and instead provoke disagreements on exactly which cognitive characteristics should be


























2.1.1. The Producer (Person) in computational creativity.
Given that we expand our discussion of creativity to include the discussion of computa-
tional creativity, I propose here that it is more appropriate to refer to the creative Producer,
rather than the creative Person.
The creative Producer could be analogous to the computer, or perhapsmore accurately,
to a computer program, software, robot or a creative agent within a multi-agent system.
Here the machine is the hardware hosting the creative agent: more generally the imple-
mentation and/or embodiment of the algorithm in a particular computational system ,5
much aswemight distinguish between physical and functional characteristics of a ‘Person’.
Some interesting work has been done on modelling creative agents, for example by
Saunders (2012). Sosa and Gero distinguish between creative individuals and the creative
brain in their investigation of multiple perspectives on creativity (Sosa and Gero, 2015).
Generally, though, the emphasis in computational creativity software has tended to be
on product generation and to some extent, process modelling (Cardoso, Veale, and Wig-
gins, 2009; Colton andWiggins, 2012); computational creativity systems tend tobeoriented
towards a particular goal, domain or task. Relatively little work has directly focused on
modelling a creative entity as a collection of various personal characteristics or abilities (at
least, not independently of some creative application of those characteristics to a task). As
argued in Jordanous (2012), different types of creativity require domain-specific skills to
some extent, so domain-specific computational creativity systems tend to be built around
the most prominent necessary skills for that domain.
In the task of categorising computer systems as creative, Colton’s Creative Tripod
(Colton, 2008) emphasised the need for systems to demonstrate skill, imagination and
appreciation before they can be considered as a candidate creative system – all three of
which are allusions to personal characteristics.
Features, traits and aspects of the creative system Producer can be studied, and it would
be fascinating to explore howgeneral creative personal characteristics could be specifically
modelled within creative systems (see the Process section, next). This line of thought has
been taken up by researchers within computational creativity to some extent, for example
the aforementionedCreative tripod (Colton, 2008) aswell as others (Grace andMaher, 2015;
Maher, Merrick, and Saunders, 2008; Saunders, 2002; Wiggins, 2006). Computational mod-
elling of characteristics that encourage creativity could help us progress our systems to be
able to be creative in more than one system which they were originally designed for; this
wouldbe significant progress in our pursuit ofmodelling creativity as aphenomenonwhich
transcends different types of creative activity.
The Producer could also include the individual(s) interacting with a creativity support
system or co-creative system which interacts with people (Kantosalo, Toivanen, Toivonen,
and Xiao, 2014; Maher, 2012). Another possible interpretation of the producer in com-
putational creativity would be to acknowledge the role of the programmer(s), tester(s),
researcher(s) and peers involved in shaping the project.
2.2. The Four Ps: Process
The creative process has been broken down into a series of sequential or cyclic stages
occurring over time (Poincaré, 1929; Wallas, 1945) or subtasks (Odena and Welch, 2009).


























down the creative process into subtasks, identifying various types of process (e.g. different
activities, group process, the structuredness or otherwise of a process and composition by
improvisation) rather than tracing a linear progression of subprocesses.
It is often stressed that creativity is not just the first flash of inspiration, but is also
the activity that validates, develops, and refines that first idea; rather than occurring at
one point in time, creativity develops over a period of time (Poincaré, 1929; Tardif and
Sternberg, 1988; Wallas, 1945). Tardif and Sternberg (1988) remind us that while creative
processes can be those employed by individual creative agents, we can also consider
creative processes where more than one agent participates.
2.2.1. The process in computational creativity.
In computational creativity, the creative process might be the algorithms employed by a
singlepieceof software, or interactionsbetweenmultiplemachinesor programs, or interac-
tions betweenmachine and human users, or between amachine and the environment it is
embodied in. As described above, the computational creativity community has given some
attention to the concept of creative processes employed within computational creativity,
with growing attention paid to this aspect in recent years. For example, the FlowR frame-
work (Charnley, Colton, and Llano, 2014) is designed to facilitate creative computational
workflows by chaining together processes in a linear pattern; from personal communica-
tions with members of the project team, there are plans to consider nonlinear chains of
processes as well. The work by Misztal and Indurkhya on poetry generation (Misztal and
Indurkhya, 2014) is another example of the various projects that specifically focuses on
various processes required for creativity. Genetic programming is another way in which
the process itself can be generated computationally (Koza, Streeter, Mydlowec, Yu, and
Lanza, 2003; Sims, 1994, for example).
The generate-and-test (McGraw and Hofstadter, 1993; Pease, Guhe, and Smaill, 2010, for
example) or engagement-reflection approach (Pérez y Pérez, Aguilar, and Negrete, 2010)
specifically models the creative process as a cycle of generating artefacts then amend-
ing the generation process via evaluating the generation phase. This is an approach
which deserves broader adoption within computational creativity; evaluation is a critical
part of the creative process (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Poincaré, 1929). In terms of post-
implementation evaluation, the FACE model for evaluation of creative systems (Colton,
Charnley, and Pease, 2011) places importance on computational systems being able to
report on the creative process.6
There are multiple theories about how human creativity processes are structured,
see, for example (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Hennessey and Amabile, 2010; Kaufman, 2009;
Poincaré, 1929). Computational creativity research can provide a test-bed for these psy-
chological theories and allow us to explore if implementing the theories result in creative
behaviour. For example, useful work has been done by Thornton (2008), Wiggins (2006)
and Ritchie (2006) on Boden’s creativity model (Boden, 2004). Similarly, Csikszentmiha-
lyi’s Domain-Individual-Field-Interaction (DIFI) framework has recently been implemented
within computational creativity research (Chordia and Rae, 2010; de Silva Garza and
Gero, 2010; Saunders, Gemeinboeck, Lombard, Bourke, and Kocaballi, 2010). Conferences
such as the Creativity and Cognition series showcase work that links between theory and


























of computational creativity research, and help findings flow better between computational
creativity and human creativity research.
2.3. The Four Ps: Product
Many authors advocate that proof of creativity is necessary to be considered creative
(Kagan, 1967; Plucker et al., 2004; Ritchie, 2001; Tardif and Sternberg, 1988). The product-
centric view adopted by computational creativity researchers such as Ritchie (2007), that
creative products are both necessary and sufficient for creativity, was present in earlier
human creativity research (Kagan, 1967). But, inspired by Guilford’s seminal 1950 address
on creativity research, emphasis in human creativity research shifted from identifying cre-
ative individuals post-production of creativework, to predicting future potential for creativ-
ity in individuals. This change in emphasis is illustrated in the proliferation of psychometric
tests (Jordanous, 2012; Kaufman, 2009) within creativity research.
Tardif and Sternberg (1988) considered the creative product more briefly than the other
three ‘Ps’ in their review, deciding that while a creative product is essential for creativity,
it is not enough merely to generate a product; the product should also be considered in a
domain-specific context.
Computational creativity research has long acknowledged the importance of the out-
put or artefacts generated by creative systems, as described above. To borrow a metaphor
from human creativity research, it has been common (until recently) for computational
creativity to follow the product-centric approach to creativity as advocated by Kagan: “Cre-
ativity refers to a product, and if made by a man, we give him the honor of the adjective ”.
(Kagan, 1967, p. viii)
2.3.1. The product in computational creativity.
Generating creative products has been an area of significant success for computational
creativity. To see examples, one just needs to consult any year’s proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Computational Creativity where there are multiple examples to
be found of systems which are reported in terms of the products they generate (Besold
and Plaza, 2015; Harmon, 2015; Misztal and Indurkhya, 2014; Monteith, Francisco, Martinez,
Gervás, and Ventura, 2011; Sims, 1994, to cite just a selection of these many examples).
The success of systems is often reported in terms of what kind of artefacts they generate,
as noted in Jordanous (2011). Some systems have been evaluated using Graeme Ritchie’s
empirical criteria (Ritchie, 2001, 2007),which exclusively focuses onevaluating theproducts
of computational systems without considering any of the other three Ps.7
2.4. The Four Ps: Press/Environment
The Press perspective encompasses a bidirectional perspective between the environment
which influences the creator and receives the creative work, and the creator who publicises
their work and is given feedback on what they produce. Tardif and Sternberg (1988) con-
sidered both creative domains themselves and the social environments in which creative
people are influenced as they employ creative process, advertise their creative products
and receive feedback. Rhodes (1961) concentrated on the role that the environment plays


























the external world after being created. Rhodes reflected on how everyone is different, so
everyone perceives the world in a unique way and processes ideas according to their own
contexts.
Of the Four Ps, this is the perspective that is often neglected when one takes an indi-
vidualistic view of creativity. In general creativity theorists do however acknowledge the
influence of the environment in which creativity is situated (Hennessey and Amabile, 1988;
Simonton, 1988). If one concentrates on an individual’s creativity, however, the Press per-
spective is often neglected, even if unintentionally. For example, although stating that
“[t]o be appreciated as creative. a work of art or a scientific theory has to be understood
in a specific relation to what preceded it” (Boden, 2004, p. 74), Boden’s treatment of cre-
ativity mainly focused on different cognitive processes of creativity, rather than a detailed
examination of social or environmental influences.
2.4.1. The Press in computational creativity.
Some computational creativity researchers are starting to highlight the importance of the
environment inwhich a creative system is situated (Jennings, 2010; Pease andColton, 2011;
Saunders, 2012; Sosa, Gero, and Jennings, 2009), with some of this work influenced by
the DIFI (Domain-Individual-Field-Interaction) framework (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) men-
tioned above. The role of the audience in interpreting creative content has been acknowl-
edged (Gervás and León, 2014; Veale and Li, 2015). Sosa and Gero (2015) identify different
sub-perspectives of Press in their multi-dimensional creativity framework: MDC-C (cul-
tural dimensions at an epistemological level), MDC-S (societal implications) and MDC-G
(creativity at the scale of individual groups or teams).
Social interaction between creative agents and their audience is an areawhich had been
neglected till recently: for example nearly 75% of papers in the 2014 International Con-
ference on Computational Creativity failed to make any reference to social or interactive
aspects of creativity. But creativity cannot exist in a vacuum. A recent increase in develop-
ment of the interactivity of creative systems8 (especially where this affects the way these
systems works) has been highlighted as a positive advance (Colton and Wiggins, 2012). At
theAISBworkshopon computational creativity in 2015, a panel discussion on social creativ-
ity and its implications for computational creativity underlined theway inwhich researchers
within the field are aware of thedangers of a “silo” -like approach tomodellingor simulating
creativity. This discussion also explored thebreadth ofmeaningbehind the term “social cre-
ativity” in computational creativity; similar considerations have also recently been explored
(separately) and published by Saunders and Bown (2015).
There is a separate point to acknowledge regarding Press in computational creativity.
As computational creativity researchers, we should stay aware of any potential biases that
may be introduced, should an audience be aware that the creative agent of interest is
computational rather than human (Jordanous, 2012; Moffat and Kelly, 2006).9
2.5. Interaction between the Four Ps
The mysterious impression often associated with creativity (Boden, 2004; Kaufman, 2009;



























Each strand [of the Four Ps] has unique identity academically, but only in unity do the four
strands operate functionally. It is this very fact of synthesis that causes fog in talk about
creativity and this may be the basis for the semblance of a “cult”. (Rhodes, 1961, p. 307)
Simonton (1988) saw discrepancies between combining the Four Ps in theory and in
practice:
Now, in an ideal state of affairs, it should notmatter which one of the four p’s our investigations
target, for they all will converge on the same underlying phenomenon. . . . But reality is not so
simple, needless to say. The creative process need not arrive at a creative product, nor must
all creative products ensue from the same process or personality type; and others may ignore
the process, discredit the product, or reject the personality when making attributions about
creativity. (Simonton, 1988, p. 387)
From this, one conclusion which seems to follow naturally is that an accurate and com-
prehensive definition of creativity must account for the (potential) presence of all four
aspects, in order to be complete. Simonton, however, concluded that “[i]f we cannot
assume that all four aspects cohesively hang together, then it may be best to select one
single definition and subordinate the others to that orientation” (Simonton, 1988, p. 387),
with his natural research inclination leading him to focus his work on persuasion, his term
for the effect that the creative individual has on their environment.
Rhodes argued that creativity research should follow a specific path: “from product to
person and thence to process and to press”. (Rhodes, 1961, p. 309)
Objective investigation into the nature of the creative process can proceed in only one direc-
tion, i.e. from product to person and thence to process and to press. (Rhodes, 1961, p. 309)
Such a statement makes Rhodes’s contribution less useful. For example, the Press (envi-
ronment) in which one is creative has some influence on the creative Process, so one may
prefer to study how Press and Producer interact before looking at Process issues. Simon-
ton viewed creativity as how a person’s ideas emerge as influential when that person, by
chance, has new ideas and promotes them to influence others. Creative people would not
be equivalent to lucky people, by this interpretation, but chance would intervene in their
success. Simonton refers to this as the “chance-configuration theory” that “outlines the
general conditions that favor creativity” (Simonton, 1988, p. 422).
Tardif and Sternberg (1988) treated each of the Four Ps individually, “as these really are
separate levels of analysis, and it is from comparisons within levels that coherent state-
ments about our knowledge of creativity can bemade” (Tardif and Sternberg, 1988, p. 429).
Tardif and Sternberg’s summary is weakened somewhat by this as it does not make com-
parisons across the Four Ps, despite highlighting Simonton’s emphasis on the interactions
and relationsbetween these four views (Simonton, 1988). In contrastMooney (1963) argued
that the four approaches should be integrated in a model of creativity, proposing a model
that “puts together the four approaches by showing them to be aspects of one unifying
idea” (Mooney, 1963, p. 333). While Mooney’s claims become rather grandiose at points,
Mooney’smore specific contributions on creativitymatch neatly with the Four Ps approach
identified elsewhere at that date (Rhodes, 1961; Stein, 1963).
2.5.1. Interaction between Four Ps in computational creativity.
Sosa and Gero (2015) advocate that creativity is a construct containing multiple levels


























the study of creativity (which, they argue, is reasonably well afforded by computational
approaches). In a similar vein, this paper argues that we can make significant progress in
computational creativity by considering all Four Ps in our computational creativity work.10
Generation of creative products is only a quarter of the full picture of creativity, only one
of the Four “Ps”. Granted, we have achievedmuch success in product generation, as exem-
plified by exhibitions, concerts and other demonstrations of creative products reported in
various papers on computational creativity systems (Jordanous, 2011). However, the more
mature work and exciting potential comes from the incorporation of the other three Ps,
at least to some extent, such as in Saunders (2012), Gervás and León (2014), Misztal and
Indurkhya (2014). Saunders’ work (Saunders, 2012) looks at models of creative Producers
as autonomous agents that employ a Process of interacting with their Press (via an agent-
based system) toproduce creative Products.Misztal and Indurkhyahavewritten “empathic”
software: a computational Producer of poetry that canbeaffectedbyandcanexpress differ-
entmoods andemotions in its poetry Products (Misztal and Indurkhya, 2014). The Processes
employed by the system are based on cognitive models of consciousness, with a Press of
several “experts” interacting together using a “Blackboard” architecture to pass information
between each other. The ICTIVSmodel (Gervás and León, 2014) is an example ofmore theo-
retical work that considers how Products (in this paper the S in ICTIVS stands for stories) can
be generated by the multi stage Process model of ICTIVS: individual Producers employing
stages of Invention and Composition to generate stories, then within a Press, employing
stages of Transmission for the stories to be subject to Interpretation and Validation.
3. Four Ps and computational creativity in practice
3.1. The product/process debate in computational creativity evaluation
As a research community, we have largely focused on assessment of creativity via assessment
of the artefacts produced. (Colton, 2008, p. 1)
As illustrated by the ICCC 2014 call for papers, one important debate in computational cre-
ativity is about whether evaluation of a creative system should focus exclusively on the
output produced by the system, or whether the processes built into the system should
also be taken into account. Should both product and process be included in evaluation
(Colton, 2008; Jordanous, 2012; Pease, Winterstein, and Colton, 2001), or should evalua-
tion concentrate solely on the product of systems (Ritchie, 2007)? Ritchie (2007) stated
that examining the process is unimportant for creativity, arguing that humans normally
judge the creativity of others by what they produce, because one cannot easily observe
the underlying process of human creativity. Ritchie therefore advocated a black-box test-
ing approach, where the inner program workings are treated as unknown and evaluation
concentrates on the system’s results. Later, however, Ritchie (2008) conceded that it can be
important to consider a system’s “mechanisms” in the case of “more theoretical research”
(Ritchie, 2008, p. 147).
While it is true that we can only use the material we have available to form an evalua-
tion, evaluationexperiments (Jordanous, 2012; Pearce andWiggins, 2001) show thatpeople
often make assumptions about process in their judgements on product. As Hofstadter


























means of watching overt behaviour . . . [this approach] lies at the very heart of modern sci-
ence”. (Hofstadter, 1994, quoted in p. 10, Pease et al., 2001). Pearce and Wiggins (2001)
discussed how our interpretation of how something was produced is important, even if
the actual method is unknown, and that such an interpretation can be derived if people
are repeatedly exposed to the compositional systems (human or computational) that they
are evaluating. Collins (2008) discussed howmaking reasonable assumptions can assist the
reverse-engineering11 of program code from output, in scenarios where white-box testing
(evaluation with access to the program code) is not possible.
Colton (2008) acknowledged Ritchie’s arguments but quotes examples from art to
demonstrate that process is as important as the end product when evaluating creativity,
at least in the artistic domain. As evidence, Colton cites conceptual art for details on con-
ceptual art in the context of this debate, where the concepts and motivations behind the
artistic process are a significant contribution of the artwork. Sol LeWitt defined Concep-
tual Art (LeWitt, 1967) as an art form where “the idea or concept is the most important
aspect of the work. . . . The idea becomes a machine that makes the art”. Jordanous (2012)
makes similar arguments for creativity in musical improvisation, finding that the process of
improvisation is often seen as more relevant for creativity than the end result.
If assessing how creative a piece of conceptual art or a musical improvisation is, solely
by evaluating the product, then there are two negative consequences:
(1) A key aspect of the intentions of the artist/musician is overlooked (the evaluator’s focus
is on the end result rather than how the creative work is made).
(2) The level of creativity presented could be misjudged, especially if the creative process
results in producing something that might seem commonplace outside the context of
that art installation/musical performance.
Colton (2008) also posed a thought experiment that considers two near-identical paint-
ings presented at an exhibition. In the first painting, the dots are placed randomly, whereas
in the second, the dots’ locations represent the artist’s friendships with various people.
Colton argued that the second painting would be more appealing to purchase than the
first, though the end product is very similar, due to the process by which it was cre-
ated. Colton’s thought experiment illustrates how process can impact on our judgement
of creative artefacts (as well as highlighting the role of the Press in attributing creativ-
ity), though one could question if the experiment explores perception of creativity, or of
quality/appeal.
The thought experiment described by Ventura (2008) gives further evidence (perhaps
unintentionally) onhowknowledgeof the creative process affects howweevaluate creativ-
ity. Two creative systems, the RASTER and iRASTER systems, were designed by Ventura to
be decidedly non-creative. If these systemswere implemented and their generated images
were given to people to evaluate without telling the evaluators how they were produced,
the evaluators may well rate the creativity of the system highly. Supplying the evaluators
with details of how a program works, though, could have a detrimental impact on the
subsequent evaluations (Colton, 2008; Cope, 2005).
One issue with creativity is analogous to the adage that a magician never reveals their


























you have found out how the magician performed the trick. Similarly things can appear to
be less creative when you know how they were produced:12
it is not unknown for critics of AI to refuse to accept programs as creative (or intelligent) once
the mundane mechanistic nature of the inner workings are revealed. (Ritchie, 2001, p. 4)
Colton (2008) intentionally sidestepped this issue by reporting on his artistic system in
high-level terms only, rather than giving details of the program (Colton, 2008, p. 8).
Until recently, computational creativity evaluation methodologies mainly looked solely
at a system’s products (Ritchie, 2007, for example) or at a combination of the products and
the process (Pease et al., 2001). Recently it has been acknowledged that there ismore to cre-
ativity than process and product, with the Creative Tripod (Colton, 2008), whose evaluative
framework is influenced by how an audience perceives the creativity of a system, SPECS
(Jordanous, 2012) which requires the researcher to investigate what creativity means in
the context of their system, and the FACE/IDEAmodels (Colton et al., 2011) which consider
various aesthetic features and interactions between audience and system. Work on com-
putationally creative societies has also developed in the last few years (Saunders, 2012, is a
significant example).
Along a similar broadening of perspectives, the next section brings in work from the
wider creativity research community, examining further viewpoints – the creative per-
son operating in a press/environment – and relating these viewpoints to a computational
creativity standpoint.
3.2. Reviewing the Four Ps in recent computational creativity research
To what extent are the Four Ps implemented in current computational creativity work
in practice? To answer this question, we can examine the work presented in the most
recent International Conference on Computational Creativity, the key annual conference
in this area of research and “the only scientific conference that focuses on computational
creativity and also covers all aspects of it” (Toivonen, Colton, Cook, and Ventura, 2015,
p. ii).
The 2015 edition of this conference was held in Park City, Utah, US13 and 4114 papers
were presented, covering five categories:
‘‘(1) technical papers advancing the state of art in research,
(2) system and resource description papers,
(3) study papers presenting enlightening novel perspectives,
(4) cultural application papers presenting the usage of creative software, and
(5) position papers arguing for an opinion”.
(Toivonen et al., 2015, p. ii)
Each of the papers in ICCC’15 were reviewed to determine if they considered each of the
Four Ps. As shown in Figure 2, all Four Ps were mentioned in the set of ICCC papers fairly
evenly.
• 21 papers (51%) considered the Producer in computational creativity by some angle, for
example, characteristics that a system should implement in order to be creative.



























Figure 1. A simplified view of how the Four Ps fit together in creativity.
Figure 2. Coverage of the Four Ps in papers presented at ICCC’15.
• 26 papers (63%) focused some attention on the creative Products being generated
computationally.
• 27 papers (66%) mentioned how computational creativity systems were influenced by
external environments to some degree.
All Four Ps were covered by ICCC papers in 2015 to some degree; however, Figure 2
illustrates that we are not yet at the level where all papers consider all Four Ps.15 The
papers receiving best paper awards/recognitions at ICCC’1516 each covered at least 3 of the
Four Ps:
• Best Paper: Besold and Plaza (2015) focused on using conceptual blending (Fauconnier
and Turner, 2002) as the basis for the creative Process, considering how Producers
require abilities to combine concepts and to reason over such combinations. They


























• Best Student Paper (and Runner-Up for Best Paper): Harmon (2015) presented the cre-
ative system FIGURE8 which produced similes as its Products which related to contex-
tual information (Press) and individual authorial style (Producer). The Processes behind
FIGURE8 were presented as a computational model and architecture.
• Runner-up for Best Student Paper: Kantosalo, Toivanen, and Toivonen (2015) took
unusual perspectives onmany of the Four Ps. They looked at the Process of evaluation in
computational creativity, using interaction design (i.e. the use of Press) as a framework
for evaluation which would give formative feedback (Product) which could feed back
into the creative Process of systems. The Producers they highlighted were computa-
tional creativity researchers who could use these evaluative results in work with creative
systems.
As this present analysis looks at papers which were presented a few months before the
time of writing this paper, it is less helpful to use additionally measures such as citation
analysis to identify which papers will potentially have longer term impact. Using a more
personal reflection of my own impression of the overall general contributions made by
ICCC’15 papers, Grace and Maher’s paper on “specific curiosity” (Grace and Maher, 2015)
and Bown’s paper on attributing creative agency (Bown, 2015) stood out for me as being
very well received and useful. Both these papers aroused much constructive discussion at
the conference. It is intriguing to find that the content of both of these papers includes
discussion of all Four Ps:
• Grace and Maher (2015) consider the intent of autonomous Producers to transform cre-
ative domains (Process) via exploration of the contextual Press, giving example Products
to illustrate their arguments.
• Bown (2015) discussed how creative agency can be attributed to Producers interact-
ing in networks (Press) to contribute to the existence of some artefact(s) (Product), and
considered a formal framework for creative authorship (Process).
Specific sessions at ICCC’15 showed that the computational creativity research com-
munity is collectively considering each of the Four Ps in its own right, with none being
neglected. The Creative autonomy and Imagination and curiosity sessions investigated dif-
ferent aspects of the creative Producer, while sessions on Creative mechanisms and Con-
ceptual blending covered Process aspects in creativity. Sessions on Co-creativity, Musical
interaction and Creativity support and interaction reflected recent work on the role of Press
in computational creativity, while the Visual arts and Language sessions included various
computational creativity Products.
We can look back at papers which have been highlighted in previous years as use-
ful contributions, either through being currently most highly cited papers on “com-
putational creativity”17 or through winning “best paper” awards in recent years at
conference:18
• ICCC’12: Best Student Paper Baydin et al.’s paper on evolutionary generation of analo-
gies (Baydin, DeMantaras, and Ontanon, 2012) considered the Products (analogies) of
a Producer algorithm with encoded “common-sense knowledge” and knowledge of


























this knowledge within an evolutionary Process of genetic algorithms to generate new
analogies.
• ICCC’11: Best Student Paper Carlson, Schiphorst, and Pasquier (2011) reported “Scuddle”,
a Producer with knowledge of physical bodily movement which also uses an evolu-
tionary Process of genetic algorithms to generate Products in the form of “catalysts”:
selected constraints to be imposed on what choreographic decisions are available to
choreographers, Scuddle’s Press.19
• Machado and Cardoso (2002, # citations=66) reports NEvAr, an artistic Producer system
which has the ability to critically evaluate its results, and generate image Products using
a Process of genetic algorithms. In terms of Press, it can run several instantiations of the
genetic algorithm at one time, and individuals from each population (each instantiation
of the genetic algorithm) can be swopped between each other, affecting the operation
of NEvAr by introducing new “genetic material” for evolution of the next population.
• Ritchie (2007, # citations=51) presents Ritchie’s empirical criteria for assessing the cre-
ativity of computational creativity software; it concentrates on the creative Products
produced by creative systems and how they sit within a Press (how typical and valuable
those Products are perceived to be). To some extent it considers Producers, via creative
systems’ knowledge of inspiring sets of examples: artefacts in a particular domain which
the system is aware of and which it is “inspired by” in its Process. Ritchie’s work has
been criticised (Colton, 2008; Jordanous and Keller, 2012, e.g.) for neglecting to take into
account the creative Process during evaluation.
• Wiggins (2006, # citations=40) considers a theoretical framework for creative Producers
with a key ability: being able to search a conceptual space for new creative possibilities.
The environmental Press in this case is a set of acceptable artefacts within a creative
domain (in this case, “acceptable” is determined by various rules that govern how that
Press is defined). Wiggins cites a model of creative Producers that can search this Press,
with a set of rules and a vocabulary for expressing both the rules and the artefacts which
the Producer can generate. Process is modelled in Wiggins’ framework as a function
generator.20
• Gervás (2009, # citations=29) summarises progress to date21 in computational gen-
eration of stories. This paper addresses all Four Ps from the start: with a discussion of
the creative Process in different systems, which includes reference to “explicit action by
some agent that we shall refer to as the creator” (Gervás, 2009, p. 49) – suggesting the
Producer; the output of these systems – the Products; and the audiencewhose points of
view are relevant in perceiving and evaluating the results – the Press.
4. Applying the Four Ps: examples of novelty and value
Novelty (originality, newness) and value (usefulness, appropriateness) form key parts of
creativity (Boden, 2004; Jordanous, 2012; Mayer, 1999; Ritchie, 2007), often being identi-
fied as the two main aspects of computational creativity (Brown, Boden, D’Inverno, and
McCormack, 2009, Pease et al., 2001; Ritchie, 2007, for example). 22 Work in computa-
tional creativity illustrates both novelty and utility from each of the Four P perspectives,
although some perspectives are represented more plentifully within computational cre-


























computational creativity from each of the Four P perspectives. Considering novelty from
each of the Four Ps:
Product Novelty is well associated with system outputs and products: how novel are
the generated artefact(s)? The novelty of artefacts generatedby computational creativ-
ity systems is a key consideration in Ritchie’s empirical criteria for evaluating creative
systems (Ritchie, 2007).
ProcessAcreative process can take a novel approachor be implemented in a novelway,
perhaps employing new algorithms or techniques or different approaches. Efforts at
trying newprocesses and combinations thereof are being encouragedby systems such
as the FlowR framework (Charnley et al., 2014), which focuses specifically on enabling
us to chain different processes together for creative purposes.
Producer Incorporating newpersonal traits into computational creativity systems gives
scope for new research results. More broadly, as is often encountered in computational
creativity work, implementing or running a creative systemon newhardware or in new
software implementations may also impact upon the system’s performance and may
have unexpected results.23 The number of new systems presented each year at the
International Conference on Computational Creativity exemplifies how novel creative
entities continually arise in computational creativity research.24
Press The creativity demonstrated by a system can be noted as being novel in a partic-
ular environment, even though it may be commonplace in other environments. The
system may also exploit the surrounding press in previously unexplored ways. This
was demonstrated neatly by the combination of two systems in Monteith et al. (2011),
where a textual annotation system interacted with a system that generates emotion-
driven music. The two systems essentially acted as part of each other’s Press with one
system affecting the environment the other was working in. The combination resulted
in novel interpretations of fairy tales; such results would not have arisen were the
systems operating in isolation.
Considering value from each of the Four P perspectives:
Product Value is also well associated with system outputs and products: how valuable
or good are the generated artefact(s)? This is a highly current area of concern within
computational creativity, withmuch evaluation concentrating on the quality of output
(Jordanous, 2011).
Process The creative processes being incorporated within creativity can be useful in
themselves for learning or studying how certain approaches and techniques work or
for cross-application to new areas. Systems with an emphasis on modelling process,
such as Misztal and Indurkhya’s poetry generator (Misztal and Indurkhya, 2014) bring
added utility by what they reveal about the processes being modelled.
Producer Some creators become more valuable than others as a contributor in their
field, based on their personal characteristics, experience and influence.25 The same can
be noted for creative systems to some extent; some are cited more often than others.
For example in a Scopus26 search of the most highly cited papers on “computational
creativity” (where the primary emphasis is on a single system), we see that the papers


























• NEvAr (Machado and Cardoso, 2002, # citations=66) – as seen earlier, this system
discusses all four Ps
• The Knowledge-Intensive Interactive Digital Storytelling (KIIDS) system (Peinado
and Gervás, 2006, # citations=22) is a Producer with knowledge of multiple
domains encoded into it, to generate folk tales as its Products. The system knows
details about its environment (its Press) through the encoded knowledge (in the
form of Semantic Web ontologies, machine-readable categorisations of knowledge
about particular domains). Though KIIDS cannot interactwith its Press, it can pick up
new information if the ontology it uses to populate its knowledge is updated with
the new information. KIIDS uses a Process of case-based reasoning to generate tales
by extrapolating from previous examples using its encoded knowledge.
• EvoEco (Kowaliw, Dorin, andMcCormack, 2012, # citations=17) is an “ecosystemic”
Producer art system which has knowledge of – and the ability to judge – what is
aesthetics pleasing in terms of images. It uses a Process of genetic algorithms to
generate image Products. Its knowledge of aesthetics has been harnessed through
an online survey, gathering information from its Press (respondents).
• al-Rifaie et al’s work (Rifaie, Bishop, and Caines, 2012, # citations=14) uses swarm
intelligence algorithms as its Process for generating artistic image Products. By
definition, swarm intelligence involves Press as it simulates the collective behaviour
of multiple members of a population (mimicing the behaviour of flocks of birds or
groups of foraging ants). One can interpret the Producer as being the system as a
whole, or as the individual members of the population which each have knowledge
of specific rules that govern the swarm behaviour (in this case rules governing how
the individuals can collectively search regions of an image canvas).
• ThePainting Fool (Colton, 2012, # citations=9) is advocatedbyColton as a Producer
which is a “creative artist in its own right” (Colton, 2012, p. 3). It learns from interact-
ing with its Press through processing various cultural sources such as news stories,
to generate artwork Products which have been presented back to its Press in the
form of exhibitions “where the effect of software which might be deemed as cre-
ative is tested in the art world and the wider public” (Colton, 2012, p. 3). It employs
a collection of various algorithms as part of its creative Processes.
Press If creative activities benefit the external world in some way, then they have value
to the press. As an example, Harold Cohen’s AARON colouring system has received
much external attention, from media discussions (McCorduck, 1991, as example) and
other publicity27 through to being the inspiration behind a screensaver for personal
computers, with the AARON system “productized by Kurzweil CyberArt Technologies,
Inc.” (http://www.kurzweilcyberart.com).
5. Discussion
The above treatments of novelty and value are brief, and are not intended to be a
full and conclusive portrait of novelty and value within computational creativity. What
the above illustrates is the ease with which different viewpoints that can be uncov-
ered using the Four Ps as signposts with which to guide our thinking around computa-
tional creativity. The breadth of issues mentioned above shows aspects of novelty and


























a product/process-oriented viewpoint; however it is argued here that those perhaps-
overlooked aspects give computational creativity researchers a closer rendition of cre-
ativity, guiding us away from incomplete viewpoints of creativity in the context of our
computational work.
Analysis of papers recognised for their contributions to computational creativity reveals
the common trend of including discussion from all Four Ps. While it is naive to say that all
good papers cover all Four Ps, and papers that do not are in some way “bad”, it would not
be controversial to remark that a good breadth of discussion in a computational creativ-
ity papermakes the general content of the paper potentiallymore relevant across a diverse
audience. Computational creativity research indeed covers a diverse range of areas and dis-
ciplines (Sosa and Gero, 2015) as can be seen by the breadth of sessions at ICCC’15, ranging
in content from theoretical investigations of conceptual blending through to games and
language applications. Papers covering all Four Ps will by definition include discussions
from all four perspectives covered by the Four Ps; there is therefore an increased potential
to make broader contributions to computational creativity research. Computational cre-
ativity researchers can use the Four Ps as a guide or “checklist” to think about their work
from different perspectives, potentially uncovering further contributions their work makes
which had previously been overlooked.28
As the field of computational creativity matures as a research discipline, it is pleasing
to see wider consideration of the Four Ps at research events. For example, we see that in
themost recent computational creativity international conference (ICCC’15), 66%of papers
mentioned Press elements of computational creativity. This is significantlymore than in the
previous year, when nearly 75%of papers had notmentioned social/environmental-related
aspects of the system in any way. As reported above, even though many papers did not
cover all Four Ps at ICCC’15, the conference included an even balance of sessions across the
Four Ps, which is pleasing to see.
6. Conclusion
The difficulty of understanding what creativity is should not discourage us in our attempts
to do so (Colton, 2008; Plucker et al., 2004; Rhodes, 1961), either to understand human cre-
ativity or to work with computational creativity. In creativity research, the Four Ps construct
ensures we pay attention to four key aspects of creativity: the creative Producer, the gen-
erated Products, the creative Process and the Press/Environment hosting and influencing
the creativity. This framework helps us to consider creativity more broadly, and is a useful
framework to guide computational creativity researchers in their work modelling, simulat-
ing or replicating creativity. For example, if viewing novelty and value from the perspectives
of product, process, producer and press, we uncover various interpretations of these two key
concepts within computational creativity which may otherwise have been overlooked.
The Four Ps framework helps to highlight different perspectives on creativity, to portray
creativity in a fuller context. We can see from analysis of current computational creativ-
ity work that the research community is collectively acknowledging the usefulness of all
Four Ps; however, individual papers might only address a subset of the Four Ps, not all Four
(as seen by the analysis of the latest international research conference papers above). We
have seen that papers acknowledged to be particularly useful contributions (e.g. through


























paper argues that the Four Ps can be used by computational creativity researchers to help
them maximise the potential of their work: to make broader contributions across multiple
perspectives across the computational creativity community.
To conclude, it is worth repeating a point originally made by Rhodes over 50 years ago:
Each strand [of the Four Ps] has unique identity academically, but only in unity do the four
strands operate functionally. (Rhodes, 1961, p. 307)
Notes
1. As will be described in this paper, I shall revise Person slightly to Producer for the purposes of
relating the Four Ps to computational as well as human agents. My thanks to one of this paper’s
reviewers for helping me settle on this revised term.
2. Variants of these Ps also arise in slightly different guises in non-related areas, such as software
project management (Jacobson, Booch, Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, and Booch, 1999) or education
(Biggs, 2003).
3. As stated by the Association for Computational Creativity at http://computationalcreat-
ivity.net (last accessed January 2016).
4. Interestingly, as Rhodes’ work was published in a relatively unknown journal, some later advo-
cates of a “Four Ps”-style approach to creativity also seem unaware of Rhodes’ contribution (e.g.
Odena confirmed this in personal communications in 2009), failing to cite Rhodes’ 1961 paper.
5. Suggestions from one of the review of this paper helped shape this generalised view.
6. This report is referred to in the FACE framework as a Frame).
7. Recentlyproposedevaluationmethods suchas (Colton, 2008; Coltonet al., 2011; Jordanous, 2012)
place more emphasis on the other three “Ps”.
8. For example, see Section 3.
9. Many thanks to the reviewer of an earlier version of this paper, who raised this point.
10. A tagline originally devised by Tony Veale for ICCC conference materials in 2012 and 2015 sums
up this shift in attitude: computational creativity research is now “scoffing at mere generation [of
products]”.
11. Reverse-engineering is the process of identifying and perhaps replicating how a product ismade,
through analysis of that product.
12. If the inner workings of a program are very impressive, complex or novel, then we may still be
impressed by the program, but this is a different perspective to whether or not we think the
program is creative.
13. Proceedings (Toivonen et al., 2015) are available via the conference website at http://computati-
onalcreativity.net/iccc2015/.
14. Including 13 papers which were accepted conditionally with required revisions.
15. This might be expected to some extent because of the focused nature of conference papers on
specific research projects, whichmay not be reporting fully completed work; however we should
remember that peer-reviewed conference papers often occupy a similar status to that of jour-
nal articles in computer science, more so than in most other disciplines. This has been the case
for recent computational creativity papers, where there is as yet no dedicated journal for com-
putational creativity and papers at the key international conference ICCC undergo detailed peer
review.
16. See http://computationalcreativity.net/iccc2015/?page_id= 348.
17. Citation data are as measured by Scopus (http://www.scopus.com), which allows search results
to be ordered by descending number of citations and which includes conference publications in
its results.
18. Best paper prize information is taken from what is listed in the Association for Computational


























19. There is intention for interaction between Scuddle and its Press to become two-way via the addi-
tion of machine learning of choreographers’ preferences within Scuddle, though this work has
not appeared in paper form yet to the best of this author’s knowledge.
20. Details of each of these model aspects are left abstract, as the paper presents a theoretical
framework rather than a practical implementation of a creative system.
21. That is, progress up till 2009, the date of this paper.
22. It should be clarified that for this author, creativity consists of considerably more than novelty
and value, though these are two key components of creativity, see Jordanous (2012).
23. The novelty of unexpected results is often unintentionally exemplified when live demos of
these systems are attempted in unfamiliar computing setups (the new hardware setup can be
interpreted as a new Producer).
24. See http://www.computationalcreativity.net/conferences.
25. This has been found, for example, in the recent Valuing Electronic Music project http://valu-
ingelectronicmusic.org (Allington, Dueck, and Jordanous, 2015), where some people’s endorse-
ments can have a greater influence on the perceived value of an electronic musician and their
work.
26. http://www.scopus.com.
27. See http://www.aaronshome.com/ for an extensive list of talks and publications.
28. Certainly this author can report having experienced this positive effect of uncovering previously
overlooked aspects, for examplewhen considering novelty and value in computational creativity
from the Four P perspectives.
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